Imperialism,
religion and class in Swat
By
Sartaj Khan
International
Socialism Nº 123, June 2009
Introduction
of International Socialism
The
Pakistan military claimed at the beginning of June that it
had achieved success in its all-out assault on Taliban
insurgents after driving more than two million people from
the Swat Valley and other areas of the north west of the
country. The assault followed the breakdown of an agreement
reached in February between the government and Sufi Mohammad,
leader of one of the Islamist groups, for Swat’s legal
code to be based on Nizam-e-Adl —an attempt to mix
constitutional rules with the local interpretation of sharia
law. The agreement was meant to bring an end to fighting
between the Pakistan army and the Swat Taliban, led by Sufi
Muhammad’s son in law, Maulana Fazullah.
The
military onslaught happened after pressure from the US,
which worried about the implications an agreement between
the Pakistan government and the Taliban would have for its
operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Pakistan. But the
assault found favour with most liberal and “civil society”
opinion, and much of the left, even if this was sometimes
mixed with horror at the effects on civilians. Articles in
the Pakistani press habitually refer to the “barbarity”
of “terrorist” rule in Swat. This feeling was given a
sharp edge by a mobile phone video supposedly showing a 17
year old woman receiving 30 whippings for “illicit”
relations with a man—although other reports claim that the
video was fraudulent and that the woman has denied she was
whipped. [1] Whatever the truth of the matter, the video
played a role in leading much of the left internationally to
take a similar approach to the Pakistani liberals, treating
the Pakistan Taliban as if it were as much a foreign force
in Swat as the Pakistan army or the US army in Afghanistan.
Yet there is strong evidence of a class element to the
conflict. The New York Times could report in April, “The
Taliban have advanced deeper into Pakistan by engineering a
class revolt that exploits profound fissures between a small
group of wealthy landlords and their landless tenants…the
Taliban seized control by pushing out about four dozen
landlords who held the most power. To do so, the militants
organised peasants into armed gangs that became their shock
troops.”
The
Karachi newspaper The News has carried a debate which,
according to one far left contributor, “has pitted those
who claim that the situation in Swat is a reflection of
longstanding class inequities against those who refute this
notion of ‘class war’; while the former suggest that the
‘Taliban’ has generated support amongst the subordinate
classes, the latter argue that the ‘Taliban’ has imposed
itself in the area on the basis of brute force”. [2] One
of the articles prompting the debate, reprinted in edited
form here, came from Sartaj Khan of the International
Socialists of Pakistan.
***
Imperialism,
religion and class in Swat
By
Sartaj Khan
Society
in Swat is divided bitterly on ethnic and class bases. Those
known as Khans are feudals, while those known as Pushtun,
Sayed and Miagan are owners of considerable
cultivated land. These groups were dominant for centuries
before they were challenged from two sides—by the emerging
commercial bourgeoisies and new middle classes on one side
and the landless on the other. There are two sets of non-landowning
groups. First there are the old inhabitants of the valley—the
Gujars, Ajar, Khostanis and Kami Kamins—marginalised
by the conquest by the elite groups in the 16th century.
These are the “wretched of the earth” who have been
denied their right to the land. Then there are the “commoners”,
the traditional petty bourgeoisie, such as blacksmiths,
cobblers and barbers.
The
anthropologist Fredrik Barth, who studied the area 40 years
ago, described the divisions as analogous to that of the
caste system in India, with separate mosques and graveyards
for elite groups and the commons. He found the non-landowning
groups to be “directly or indirectly dependent on the
landowners both politically and economically”.
However,
a commercial bourgeoisie and a so-called “new middle class”
emerged to challenge the old Khanite landed classes across
the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). This is connected
with the migration of large numbers of Swat’s inhabitants
to industrial zones such as in Karachi since the 1960s. Most
worked in the textile industry but a small minority did
emerge as middle class. From the 1980s onwards people from
Swat have also travelled to the United Arab Emirates and
Saudi Arabia. The impact of the remittances from these
migrants is uneven. Abid Qaiym Suleri and Kevin Savage claim
that “remittance households are generally better off than
non-remittance, own better houses and more valuable assets”;
a Sustainable Development Policy Institute discussion paper
notes “the poverty alleviation often associated with
labour migration has yet to reach rural NWFP”.
Further
contributing to the growth of the middle class has been the
money made by selling off forest, and smuggling goods,
weapons and drugs. Real estate agents, transporters,
contractors, traders, personnel in the state bureaucracy and
the armed forces, and, above all, government agents from the
periods of the Zia and Musharraf military regimes have
wealth and power from sources other than land. So too do
some from the old exploiting classes. These changes have
considerable implications for the social order.
NWFP
is the poorest province of Pakistan with 43 percent poverty.
Some 85 percent of the population live in the rural areas.
Swat is 17th out of 24 districts in NWFP ranked in terms of
average income. The situation is deteriorating with every
passing day.
The
rise of Islamism
Three
movements, all in the guise of Islamism, arose to give
expression to the desires of the petty bourgeoisies and new
middle classes. They have each challenged the dominance of
the Khanite landed autocracy. Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat
Muhammad (TNSM) was founded by Sufi Muhammad in 1992.
It enjoyed the support of former servicemen and the
commercial bourgeoisie, capitalising on two vital issues:
the judicial system imposed on Provincially Tribal
Administered Areas (PATA) and the corrupt national political
system. Both systems alienated the masses of Swat.
Swat
was a “princely state” until it was fully absorbed into
Pakistan in 1969 and subjected to the PATA regulations.[3]
The old Jirga of Kheels (council of tribes) that
had endorsed previous rulers was replaced by the corrupt Dala
(or Para-Jamba) system, where leaders
supported adherents by hook or crook, concentrated on petty
issues and ignored the common cause. The year Swat merged
with Pakistan was also a year of the mass peasant upheaval
in the country. The landless occupied the land they
cultivated. Thanks to this movement, Gujars, mostly
peasants, acquired up to 42 percent of land in some villages.
But settlements of these cases are still pending in the
courts.
The
judicial system in Pakistan is corrupt to the core and land
cases take decades to process. The more remote the rural
area is, the greater the likelihood that the case will be
prolonged. A common view is that a single generation never
sees a settlement in its own lifetime.
The
arrival of neoliberalism in the 1990s saw a speculative boom
in real estate. But the real estate agents who hoped to
benefit from this also saw their land deals and commissions
held up by the judicial system. Sufi Muhammad’s TNSM
gained support because of these judicial delays. It
presented sharia law as the answer to the public grievances,
most significantly the rapid settlement of land disputes.
But in 2001 TNSM’s leaders were arrested after it
mobilised publicly for jihad in Afghanistan against
the US invasion. This allowed the reformist Islamists’
political coalition, the MMA,[4] to gain in the elections of
2002. Their petty bourgeois leadership mobilised the rural
poor to defeat the politics of Dala-Para-Jamba but
they too were soon found to be corrupt, alienating the
masses. The secular Pushtun nationalists of the Awami
National Party[5] won the elections in 2008 but lost the
support of the people even more quickly. The Pakistan
Taliban were waiting in the wings.
The
social base of the Taliban in Swat
Islamism
builds at the expense of the liberal-left, secular
nationalist movement. The Pushtun nationalism of the Awami
National Party and Islamic reformism of the MMA failed to
challenge the ruling elite or imperialism, mainly due to
their class character. The anti-imperialist rhetoric of the
Taliban largely displaced the secular nationalists,
portraying corrupt rulers as puppets responsible for the
poverty and misery in the country.
Poverty
had increased in the 1990s, after declining in the 1970s and
1980s. The globalisation of war and the integration of
Pakistan into the world market paved the way for the
emergence of new movements and brought changes to old ones.
Islam and Islamic leaders could transcend the boundaries of
a society dominated by ethnic, cultural and tribal lineages,
uniting people in a common cause. Class interests could be
disseminated in the name of Islam and sharia. That is how
Mullah Fazlullah, the leader of the Swat Taliban, appeared
on the scene. A dropout from a school in Mingora and a wire-lift
operator who worked for Rs 1500 (around £15) per month, he
emerged at the age of 28 as the leader of his organisation.
He
initially enjoyed support from all sections of society.
Prince Asfandiar Amir Zeb, the descendant of the family that
ruled Swat for years and the grandson of a former president
of Pakistan, said, “Quick justice and efficient government”
was what “people wanted” and this was “what the people
saw” in Fazlullah. Fazlullah’s madrassa (religious
school) in Swat was built with the support of the petty
bourgeoisie and the middle class, with people across the
valley donating $2.5 million for the cause. Every village
was given a specific target and a turn at working for the
building.
But
the big landlords kept their distance and as the movement
gained momentum it changed rapidly. As it became more
radicalised, resentment developed among sections of the
middle classes. Today the militant sections of the movement
come from the rural poor—a significant difference with the
petty bourgeois and middle class domination of the TNSM in
its prime.
According
to Khadim Hussain (an academic who supports military action
in Swat), Fazlullah “communicates with…groups that do
not have a share in the land distribution of the area…in
their language”. His “supporters in the marginalised
groups get a sense of empowerment… Both the state and the
traditional elites along with the political elites of the
valley…have all along failed to respond to the aspirations
of those who remained marginalised.”
Militants
are targeting Khans regardless of their political
affiliations. According to journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai,
“The militants justify the attacks by alleging that the
Khans committed excesses on the common and landless people
in the past.” The police and administration always sided
with feudals so they too are being targeted.
The
first political leader who came under attack from militants
was Malik Bakhat Baidar. He was a businessman, vice-president
of the Swat Awami National Party, belonged to a wealthy
family and was in close contact with the armed forces. Even
Prince Asfandiar Amir Zeb was not spared. He bitterly
opposed Fazlullah and frequently requested that dictator
General Musharraf undertake military operations against the
TNSM. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)[6] leader Mohammad
Sher Khan and his family were targeted many times. He
escaped narrowly but his brother, Kabir Khan, was killed
along with his wife and son. The two brothers of another PPP
leader, Mohammad Zimmer, were also assassinated.
After
the collapse of the first peace talks and army operation in
Swat last year, the feudals from the Awami National Party
came under attack from the militants. The biggest Khan,
former federal minister Afzal Khan Lala, was attacked
several times but survived. Ministers from Swat and all
seven members of the provincial assembly were forced to take
refuge in Peshawar or Islamabad.
The
present conflict in Swat grew out of a broader struggle that
has been waged by the exploited classes for centuries. The
agreement in February was a victory for the militants, but
they were led by the madrassa-owning and small landholding
layer of petty bourgeoisie. Instead of liberation from the
Khans and state rule, the leaders of the uprising agreed to
share control with them, while continuing to use the
rhetoric of liberation. The agreement allowed exceptional
repressive power through the open-ended sharia, which was
essential for the petty bourgeoisie to suppress the
expectations of the lower classes. It recognised the failure
of the neoliberal order but in a way that expressed the
desire for liberation of the petty bourgeoisie alone.
Everybody knew that the agreement would break down. The
Pakistani military regarded it as only a temporary expedient.
Their spokesman said on the eve of the agreement that it was
only a pause.
Much
of the left has taken the same position as over the
occupation of Afghanistan: it is against the occupiers and
occupied as well; against the imperialist invasion and
“terrorism” at the same time. Generally the left is
bankrupt and fails to understand the dynamics of capitalism
or the implications of war, and consequently the resistance
to it. It is still living in the era of the 1960s: if there
is class struggle it must be waged under the leadership of
an enlightened and educated Maoist intelligentsia under a
red banner. No class war in the name of religion is seen as
possible.
Meanwhile
two and a half million people have been forced from their
homes. The society of Swat, once considered a paradise, has
turned into hell.
Notes:
1: “Swat Girl Denies Flogging by Taliban”, The News, Karachi, 6 April
2009.
2: Asim Sjjadd Akhtar, “Some Observations On The War In Swat”, The News,
Karachi, 29 January, 2009, www.thenews.com.pk/editorial_detail.asp?id=159609
3: Kalim Bahadur, Democracy in Pakistan (Har-Anand Publications, 1998),
p310.
4: The coalition of Islamist parties that contests elections and ran the
NWFP government until last year’s elections.
5: The Awami National Party supports the Pakistani People’s Party
government.
6: The party of the Bhutto family and of the current president, Asif Ali
Zadari (Benazir Bhutto’s widower); originally formed in
the late 1960s with a social democratic colouring, it is
dominated by rich landowners and supportive of US
imperialism.
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