On
January 31, the Wall Street Journal printed words
that Bashar al–Asad must wince to recall. In an interview
with the newspaper, the Syrian president said that Arab
rulers would need to move faster to accommodate the rising
political and economic aspirations of Arab peoples. “If
you didn’t see the need for reform before what happened in
Egypt and Tunisia, it’s too late to do any reform,” he
chided his fellow leaders. But Asad went on to assure the
interviewer (and perhaps himself): “Syria is stable. Why?
Because you have to be very closely linked to the beliefs of
the people. This is the core issue. When there is divergence…
you will have this vacuum that creates disturbances.”
Not
even two months later, confrontations between protesters and
security forces across Syria shook the Baathist regime
harder than any challenge since the 1980s. No matter what
the course of the upheavals, the Syria that many have known
for decades will never be the same. The protests have torn
asunder the delicate fabric of rules, explicit and implicit,
that for decades have determined the relations between the
regime and the citizenry. By Syrian standards, the political
concessions promised by regime representatives to quiet the
unrest are far–reaching; long years of civil society
activism were unable to achieve them. By the yardstick of
the times, however, the moves have turned out to be
inadequate. Following a presidential speech to Parliament on
March 30, it looks like sweeping reform is an empty promise.
And a rising number of Syrians are not swallowing their
disappointment. The pervasive fear for which this police
state is infamous has given way to unpredictable bursts of
popular anger, as well as hope for a better future.
President
Asad, for his part, may soon feel twinges of nostalgia for
the days when Syria’s main source of dissent was a group
of intellectuals of the Civil Society Movement, most of them
elderly, who for the past ten years have called for
political pluralism and civil rights. He may miss the
occasions on which he was presented with elaborate
declarations, lists of signatures and critical articles
appearing in the Lebanese press but meant for Syrian
consumption. Many of the authors share the Baathists’
pan–Arab orientation and hardline stance toward Israel;
they could have been secular partners who built bridges to
Islamist and other more radical forces.
Just
after the US invasion of Iraq, in May 2003, many observers
pricked up their ears in surprise when a central regime
figure commended the Syrian opposition for its prudence.
Bahjat Sulayman, the powerful former head of Syrian
intelligence, wrote in the Lebanese newspaper al–Safir,
“In Syria, the regime does not have enemies but
‘opponents’ whose demands do not go beyond certain
political and economic reforms such as the end of the state
of emergency and martial law; the adoption of a law on
political parties; and the equitable redistribution of
national wealth.” [1]
Forcible regime change, Sulayman knew, was only on the
agenda of select exiles and US politicians.
But
President Asad treated the Civil Society Movement
intellectuals, with their debating clubs and talk of a soft
landing for Syria’s transition away from authoritarianism,
like a gang of criminals. The days are over when
obstreperousness is defined as discussion in the back rooms
of teahouses suffused with the aromatic smoke of water pipes.
Now the Syrian president faces tumult in the streets and the
whiff of gunpowder.
Patterns of Unrest
No
one knows how the street unrest in Syria will end, and not
only because information about the demonstrations and
clashes is so scarce. The focal points of unrest in mid–April,
the southern agricultural town of Dar‘a and the
Mediterranean port of Banyas, are no–go zones for
journalists, with all forms of communication with Banyas
reportedly cut. Reporting from anywhere in Syria has been
scanty throughout the crisis. An additional question is to
what degree Syrian cities and villages have been gripped by
fears of sectarian incidents, score settling among groups
with vested interests or heightened criminal activity ––
all specters raised by the regime –– as the protests
escalate.
Yet
the outlines of a minimum outcome have already emerged:
Power relations will be renegotiated. Inside the regime, key
posts have been reshuffled amidst rumors of open discord
between Bashar al–Asad and the security services, between
Asad and the army, between Bashar and other members of the
Asad clan and, possibly, between ‘Alawis, Sunnis and
members of other sects in the upper echelons. The regime has
less leeway in its social, economic and political decisions
going forward; it will have to frame them more cautiously,
with more urgent attention to good governance and less
reliance on repression, lest the next round of protest be
far more vigorous than that of 2011. But the current round
is far from over, in any case, and its maximum outcome is
regime change. For years, Asad has quelled demands for
fundamental change with piecemeal, sometimes cosmetic
reforms. Some strata of the public have considered him part
of the solution; the danger is that he will lose these
people and become part of the problem.
In
its foreign policy, ideological makeup and social
composition, Syria differs greatly from Tunisia or Egypt, so
the momentous events of 2011 in those countries will not
simply be replicated. Yet the pattern of Syria’s immediate
crisis is quite similar to those in other Arab countries.
The protests were sparked by a minor incident: Teens in
Dar‘a were detained for spray–painting buildings in town
with graffiti inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian
uprisings, including the famous slogan, “The people want
to overthrow the regime.” A “day of rage” was declared.
The police, unused to civil unrest, overreacted and shot
several protesters dead. Anger rose countrywide and
triggered more widespread demonstrations, which have been
met with more brutal force, in turn fueling more protest.
Bashar
al–Asad has mostly kept a low profile, feeding the early
gossip that he and his family were feuding over how to
respond. The president has behaved like the leader of a “jumlukiyya,”
as the Syrian opposition calls the country’s political
system, melding the Arabic words for republic and monarchy.
Rather than assuming responsibility for the crisis, the
“republico–monarch” has shunted the blame downward,
offering to replace the cabinet and sack the lieutenants
responsible for the hot spots around the country. In terms
of public relations, the regime has tried to make do with
sending advisers, deputies or ministers before the cameras
to explain its point of view, trotting out the president
only in extremis. Much of the regime’s verbal response has
aimed to criminalize the protests or portray them in
sectarian terms; in tandem, the regime has resorted to
lethal force to suppress the agitation. As the protests
spread, the regime turned to attempts at political
accommodation and, eventually, measures of appeasement.
In
Tunisia and Egypt, such concessions had no conciliatory
effect upon the crowds because they always came a few days
or weeks too late. In Syria, as well, the concessions appear
poorly chosen for the circumstances. On April 7, Asad
granted citizenship to some 150,000 of Syria’s Kurds who
had been stateless, answering a long–time demand of
Kurdish advocacy organizations. The measure was so overdue
that Asad got little credit. “Citizenship is the right of
every Syrian. It is not a favor. It is not the right of
anyone to grant,” retorted Habib Ibrahim, leader of a
major Kurdish party. Other concessions, like permitting
schoolteachers to wear the niqab, or full face
veil, and closing a casino, are meant to placate Islamists
but mean little to the wider base of opposition
demonstrators calling for real political reform.
In
the initial weeks, the demonstrators’ wrath has not, by
and large, targeted Bashar al–Asad himself. But the hits
are drawing closer and closer to home. Great fury is
directed toward Bashar’s brother Mahir, who has a
reputation for personal cruelty and, as head of the Fourth
Division of the Republican Guard, is a bulwark of
authoritarian rule in the country. Other names increasingly
heard in the protesters’ chants are ‘Asif Shawkat,
husband of Bashar’s sister Bushra and deputy chief of
staff of the army, and, above all, Rami Makhlouf, who owns
Syria’s cell phone companies, duty–free shops and almost
everything else that promises quick profits. Like his
counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, Makhlouf is beneficiary
of a classic predatory arrangement, whereby his
unquestioning political loyalty buys him commercial
monopolies bestowed by the state. The stories of
Makhlouf’s corruption incense ordinary Syrians, from the
working poor to the endangered middle class. No wonder the
first wave of protesters in Dar‘a burned down the local
cell phone company outlet, as well as the court building and
the Baath Party offices.
Sitting It Out
As
late as January, Asad thought he could sit out the season of
Arab revolts. As supportive Syrian columnists tirelessly
point out, Asad is a relatively young man at 45, unlike the
aging Arab leaders in trouble elsewhere. He has made no pact
with the US or Israel, keeping him close to public opinion
on regional issues. His backers adduce additional pillars of
legitimacy: Asad has maintained law and order in times of
great turbulence in the bordering nations of Iraq and
Lebanon; his secular Baathist regime has safeguarded an
atmosphere of relative religious and ethnic tolerance, which
many in the region admire; and the president has cultivated
a humble public persona, in contrast not only to dictators
like Saddam Hussein or Muammar al–Qaddafi, but also to
their uncouth sons. In the eyes of many Syrians, the junior
Asad has not lost his image as a reformer frustrated at
every turn by an irascible old guard.
The
country has indeed made progress during the ten years of
Asad’s rule in areas that are not directly related to
democracy or human rights. Syrian media outlets are more
numerous and plainspoken than under Bashar’s father Hafiz,
from whom he inherited power in 2000, provided that they do
not cross red lines related to politics, religion and sex.
Arts and letters have benefited from more freedom of
expression. Though several Internet sites are permanently
blocked, Syrians have far more access to information and the
outside world, through satellite TV, blogs and foreign
media. Cell phones and other modern equipment have become
accessible to a wider range of people. Women’s
organizations have gained strength and are granted room to
maneuver even if they are not legally registered or
explicitly supportive of the government.
There
is, in fact, considerable sympathy for Bashar al–Asad
among the population, though some of it stems from fear of
the unknown. The manifestations of pro–regime sentiment
that have popped up alongside the protests, particularly in
Damascus and Ladhiqiyya, may be orchestrated by the state,
but they are also emotionally real for the participants.
Many members of religious minorities, such as Christians and
the Druze, not to mention ‘Alawis, watch the present
upheavals with distinct unease, as they contemplate possible
backlash from the Sunni majority.
The
‘Alawis, from whose tribes the Asads and their inner
circle hail, worry they will suffer communal retribution for
the ruling clique’s ways. But much of the Sunni merchant
class, as well, has so far stuck to an alliance with the
Asad regime. As minorities and middle–class Sunnis make up
more than 50 percent of the population, they are not a
negligible constituency.
No Damascus Spring
Here
lay an opportunity for Asad shortly after he took power in
June 2000: Had he mustered the courage to curtail vested
interests and dismantle obsolete Baathist structures in the
early years, he might have called for free elections and won
them. As a leader with a genuine social base, he could have
confronted the militarist policies of President George W.
Bush without falling back upon dusty pan–Arab themes or
Islamist–sounding rhetoric. His position would be
correspondingly stronger today. But Asad chose not to put
his rule to a popular test.
The
Civil Society Movement of Syria claims the mantle of
intellectual pioneer of the 2011 Arab revolutions, with the
addendum that Tunisians turned out to be the champions in
practice. The short–lived heyday of this opposition
movement starting in September 2000 was known, indeed, as
the “Damascus spring.” That fall, the writer Michel Kilo
headlined a group of intellectuals who published the
“manifesto of the 99,” followed in December by the
“manifesto of the 1,000.” The distinguished secular
philosopher Sadiq al–‘Azm was a key signatory. The
intellectuals’ aim, to paraphrase the pointed words of
Alan George, was both bread and freedom. [2]
Riyad Sayf, an entrepreneur and outspoken member of
Parliament, went the furthest, putting forward
social–democratic ideals of a “fair market economy”
that he upheld with decent labor practices in the companies
he owns. Politically, he called for a constitutional state,
an independent legislature and courts, and a free press. But
Sayf crossed a red line when he announced his intention to
found a party of his own. He was arrested, and the
“Damascus spring” turned cold as the debating clubs in
Damascus teahouses closed down.
Today,
the regime may hastily introduce political pluralism (or a
semblance thereof) under the pressure of the street. A new
party law meant to break the stranglehold of the Baath Party
has been gathering dust in a presidential desk drawer for
years. But it is one thing for the regime to introduce such
reforms under circumstances of its own choosing and quite
another to do so under duress, with the latter step likely
to embolden the opposition to press for more. The same
dynamic holds for the regime’s various other promises,
like tackling legal discrimination against citizens of
Kurdish ethnicity, erecting a legal framework for the
activities of NGOs or promulgating a new media law. It even
holds for declaring an end to martial law, a step that,
rhetorically, has always been tied to liberation of the
Golan Heights from Israeli occupation and the end of
hostilities with Israel. Now it is purely domestic stresses
that are bringing such measures to the forefront of regime
calculations. The regime is losing one trump card after
another.
Waves of Suppression
The
massive street protests reached Syria precisely when the
regime was in a phase of increased suppression of opposition
forces, whether the older Civil Society Movement or the
bloggers and Internet activists of more recent vintage.
Several well–known human rights defenders are languishing
behind bars. The unrest also arrives at a time when Syria
has managed to extricate its head from the noose of
international isolation.
The
successes in establishing better international relations are
rooted in a series of decisions since 2008 that, on the one
hand, reflect a break with the past, even paradigm shifts,
and, on the other hand, display the growing maturity of
President Asad in foreign policy matters. A new Syrian
pragmatism has emerged after a phase of ideological
encrustation during the early phases of the Iraq war that
can be explained by both raison d’état and
desperation amidst the bellicose talk emanating from
Washington.
In
the past, it was plausible to advance the thesis that
Syria’s isolation and the regime’s feeling of
existential threat from outside was making the regime
reluctant to open up the political system and apt to crack
down heavily on opposition movements. Many had hoped that
Syria would adopt domestic reforms when the foreign threat
abated. Instead, the reverse has arguably occurred. One
experienced Syrian analyst who has worked inside the
government conceded in an interview: “I made the same
mistake. I thought there was a correlation between foreign
and domestic policy…. With or without external pressure,
we have no political change in Syria. Domestic pressure is a
continuity not a contradiction.”
Three
waves of suppression have swept through Syria during Bashar
al–Asad’s ten years in power. The first began in 2001
with the completion of the clampdown on the debating clubs
of the Civil Society Movement. Asad had adopted the Chinese
model: The regime would pursue economic reform, but
political and administrative reforms would be discarded. No
democratic experiment was in the offing as US threats of
regime change began to emerge in 2002, and the Baathist
regime subsequently entrenched itself in harsh ideological
opposition to the Iraq war. Pressure mounted on Syria,
especially from Saudi Arabia, France and the United States
in subsequent years, culminating in the autumn 2003 passage
of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, calling upon “all
remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon,” and
then the Hariri assassination in February 2005, which
eventually compelled Damascus to summon its troops in
Lebanon home.
In
the face of the regime’s obvious weakness, and with the
encouragement of Western diplomats, the opposition picked up
momentum. It took a historic step toward unity with the
Damascus Declaration of October 16, 2005. For the first
time, all major opposition groups –– ranging from the
secular civil society movement to Kurdish activists to the
outlawed Society of Muslim Brothers in their London exile
–– issued a manifesto for democratic change in Syria.
The lengthy document called for an end to emergency law and
other forms of political repression, a national summit on
democracy and a constitutional convention to draft a charter
“that foils adventurers and extremists.” The head of the
Civil Society Movement, Michel Kilo, composed the
Declaration. Under this document, Asad could have been still
part of the solution. No Asad statues were toppled in Syrian
cities. But, again, he chose to crack down.
The
second wave of persecution followed in the first half of
2006, when those who had been spared in 2001, including Kilo
and human rights lawyer Anwar al–Bunni, were arrested. The
hunt for signatories of the Damascus Declaration was
justified by the charge that they were pursuing Western
interests.
The
first two arrest campaigns adhered to the logic of
interrelation between domestic and foreign fronts. The
third, however, began at the end of 2009 when Syria had
already celebrated its reemergence onto the international
stage. In October of that year, the regime arrested Haytham
Malih, head of the Human Rights Association of Syria, and
since then has imposed travel bans upon dissident
intellectuals and otherwise sought to intimidate them. The
80–year old Malih was released only during the hectic
weeks of late March 2011, after he had gone on hunger
strike.
In
all three waves of suppression, the secular Baathist regime
has silenced the moderate, secular voices calling for
pluralism and piecemeal reform. This history is related to
why Islamist currents appear to be gaining ground in Syria.
To be sure, the Islamization of opposition politics is a
general trend in the Arab Middle East and no country is
immune. Yet there are other, more specific explanations for
its appearance in Syria. First, the regime, despite its
secular orientation, and often more out of necessity than
enthusiasm, is allied with Islamist partners like Iran,
Hizballah and Hamas in an “axis of resistance” to US and
Israeli prerogatives. A second explanation is that, not
unlike other Arab regimes, Damascus adopted a conscious
strategy of toleration for Islamism. A leading Syrian
opposition figure characterized the Baathist–Islamist
relationship as follows: “We get state power; you get
society.” Not only did this arrangement obviate a domestic
threat, it could be presented to the West as evidence that
Syria would turn Islamist if the Baathists were to lose the
state. During its confrontation with the United States in
the mid–2000s, Syria facilitated passage of Islamist
militants into Iraq in order to weaken the US occupation and
also engage in preemptive self–defense.
In
the January 31 interview with the Wall Street Journal,
Asad was still advancing a version of this argument.
Acknowledging the need for some change in the state, he
continued: “But at the same time you have to upgrade the
society and this does not mean to upgrade it technically by
upgrading qualifications. It means to open up the minds.
Actually, societies during the last three decades,
especially since the 1980s, have become more closed due to
an increase in close–mindedness that led to extremism.” [3]
In other words, Arab societies are not ready for
Western–style democracy. The choice is between stability
and chaos, between superficial, state–led secularism and a
fundamentalist stone age. In his inaugural speech of June
2000, the young president had already made his position
clear. “We cannot apply the democracy of others to
ourselves,” he said. “Western democracy, for example, is
the outcome of a long history that resulted in customs and
traditions, which distinguish the current culture of Western
societies.… We have to have our democratic experience
which is special to us, which stems from our history,
culture and civilization, and which is a response to the
needs of our society and the requirements of our reality.”
Some
Westerners have bought into the discourse prescribing a
cultural path to democracy, at least when it is politically
opportune to do so. Michel Kilo has expressed his
frustration with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who,
during a September 2008 visit to Damascus, reiterated
Asad’s notion that Syria would create a democracy of a
distinct style. The intellectual says that afterward he
reminded the French ambassador in Damascus that it was the
French who disseminated the idea of universal human rights.
Sadiq al–‘Azm, similarly, has warned against the
tendency to posit a “Western human rights” that differs
from “Islamic human rights” or the “Asian human
rights” that Malaysia and China have tried to propagate.
[4]
No
Arab leader has explained why it has taken so long for his
allegedly immature people to learn the ropes of democracy.
It grows harder and harder to explain, since the reigns of
some autocrats have lasted over 30 years, as in the Yemeni
case. Even the ten–plus years of Bashar al–Asad’s rule
in Syria have apparently not been enough time to pursue
incremental change and build institutions without
compromising on security, foreign policy restraints and
other Syrian particularities. Now the window of opportunity
may have closed.
Sparks Igniting
The
movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and other Arab states
have proven four postulates. First, the aspirations of
peoples are indeed universal. As peoples in other parts of
the world have done, Arabs have revolted against poverty,
social injustice, corruption, censorship, police
intimidation, disrespect for the rule of law and lack of
individual opportunity. The calls for accountability,
freedom and political pluralism in the Arab world have no
cultural or religious coloring and are very much compatible
with demands elsewhere.
Second,
the protesters are articulating these grievances without any
foreign impetus, save the urge to emulate the achievements
of fellow Arabs. The revolts are homegrown.
Third,
the civility, creativity, peacefulness, communitarian spirit
and social, religious and ethnic solidarity during the
protests have shown in a remarkable way that, whatever their
rulers say, Arabs are indeed mature enough for democracy.
The militarization of some movements, as in Libya, has to be
considered separately from the origin of the protests.
Fourth,
the carriers of revolution come from many strata of society,
including the educated, but politically muzzled middle class
that is exposed to economic shocks and fears of
socio–economic decline. Most of the protesters in the
Tahrir Squares of the Arab world are not inspired, and
apparently not very impressed, by the slogan “Islam is the
solution.” The Arab peoples, as Rashid Khalidi points out,
have reasserted their dignity by refuting the patronizing
attitudes of kings and presidents–for–life. [5]
Today’s revolutions, Khalidi continues, are not the first
democratic ones in the Arab world but the first directed
against Arab, rather than colonial, rulers.
A
new Arab nationalism of a civil nature has begun to
crystallize around the demonstrations. Egyptians have placed
photos on Facebook showing themselves holding up
ink–colored fingers as proof of their participation in the
March 19 referendum on constitutional amendments in advance
of the free elections that are scheduled for the fall.
Others uploaded a new status message: “Proud to be an
Egyptian.” Still other Facebook pages display the crescent
and the cross –– the twin religious symbols of the
protests in Cairo and, now, Damascus.
The
calls for dignity, participation, accountability and freedom
will put Syria’s neighbors to the test as well. The
Turkish government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
is close to Syria in the fields of security, foreign policy,
economy and tourism. Both sides speak of “family ties.”
Joint meetings of the countries’ cabinets have become
routine. At the same time, Turkey is seen as a model by many
Arab opposition forces that seek to build democracy in
majority–Muslim societies. Erdoğan has emerged as a
sharp critic of Israeli human rights violations but also of
Arab despots, whom he has urged to pursue reforms, most
vocally in the case of Husni Mubarak of Egypt. The Syrian
crisis will test the commitments of Erdoğan and his
government. Can he uphold a democratic agenda while
supporting a deeply troubled, undemocratic Asad regime?
On
another front, Israel may ironically turn out the actor that
most sincerely hopes for a continuation of the Asad regime.
Syria has been an enemy of Israel, but a stable and reliable
one. The Asad regime has retained sufficient influence over
Hizballah to persuade the Lebanese Shi‘i Islamist party,
if need be, to exercise restraint on Israel’s northern
border. With the developing unrest inside Syria, however,
all bets are off. The lowest–order question is whether a
weakened Baathist regime in Damascus will still be able to
negotiate a peace with Israel (that is, if either side
really wants it). From there, the questions for Israel only
grow more difficult. If the regime is replaced by parties
unknown, nostalgia for the Baathist era could soon set in
among the upper echelons in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The
status quo, for all its irritations, has often been
convenient: Whatever their outcome, the Arab revolts have
already eroded Israel’s ability to stake claims on Western
sympathies by calling itself the only democracy in the
Middle East.
The
West has a strong interest in stability in Syria, too. In
January, President Barack Obama decided to bypass Congress
and send the first US ambassador to Damascus in five years
–– just in time, as it turned out. Western politicians
once again face a precarious balance between their stated
values and pragmatic interests, the latter of which include
the protection of Israel. The interest in stability on
Israel’s northern flank goes a long way toward explaining
the US stance as the upheavals in Syria broke out. Speaking
on the CBS program “Face the Nation” on March 26,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pointedly declined to
condemn the repression in the harsh terms used in the Libyan
case, much less entertain talk of intervention. An
international consensus behind such measures “is not going
to happen,” Clinton said. She continued, “There’s a
different leader in Syria now. Many of the members of
Congress from both parties who have gone to Syria in recent
months have said they believe he’s a reformer.”
Subsequent US statements have been stronger, but the tone
remains dramatically different not only from the
condemnations of the Libyan regime, but also from rhetoric
employed by President George W. Bush.
Against
the background of demonstrations across the country, it is
not shocking that the Syrian security services have
approached representatives of the Civil Society Movement.
The intelligence officers whose invitations to chat were
once the equivalent of warning shots, if not warrants of
arrest, are now asking their old “opponents” to revive
their movement. But it is too late in the game.
Over
the years, the Civil Society Movement has lost Clinton’s
faith in Asad’s will to reform. In November 2010, when
today’s events seemed a remote possibility at best, Michel
Kilo reflected upon the movement’s failures. He complained
that the movement was stopped in its tracks before it was
able to broaden its circle of supporters, much less engineer
the foundation of parties. But, in accordance with
revolutionary patterns in Europe, he said, Syria’s
educated middle class had been awakened. “Once the spark
ignites the younger generation, we can withdraw,” Kilo
concluded. “At least we have paved the way.”
[6]
Endnotes:
[1]
Al–Safir, March 15, 2003.
[2]
Alan George, Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom
(London: Zed Books, 2003).
[3]
Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011.
[4]
Interviews with Sadiq al–‘Azm, Damascus and Berlin,
November 2010.
[5]
Rashid Khalidi, “Preliminary Observations on the Arab
Revolutions of 2011,” Jadaliyya, March 11, 2011.
[6]
Interview with Michel Kilo, Damascus, November 2010.