Libya:
NATO’s Gateway to the Arab Revolts
Co-opting
the Revolts: The New Intervention Order
By
Basheer al-Baker
Al–Akhbar, Cairo, August 24, 2011
This
article is translated from the Arabic Edition
NATO’s
successful role in overthrowing Colonel Gaddafi’s regime
opens the door for replicating the Libyan model in other
countries of the region. The alliance’s new strategy is
aimed at redefining its image and strategy while expanding
its traditional area of operation towards the Middle East
and the Gulf Region.
Current
events in Libya will have consequences and repercussions
well beyond the country’s borders and across the Arab
World. This is the second most vitally important event in
this decade after the occupation of Iraq. Arab and
international reactions to NATO’s involvement in Libya
suggests that what happened in Libya could happen in most
Arab countries, particularly those experiencing massive
protest movements amid growing rifts between ruler and ruled.
On
Facebook, reactions to Gaddafi’s ouster are mixed: Many
feel elated by the defeat of Tripoli’s ruler, while many
others believe that the Arab region is rapidly entering a
phase of foreign intervention. In both camps, the main focus
is Syria. The former group believes that the downfall of
Gaddafi paves the way for ousting Syrian President Bashar
Assad. Those in the second group insist that NATO’s role
in overthrowing Gaddafi proves that the Arab revolutions
have become a vehicle for Western intervention in the region.
The chasm between these positions calls for a better
understanding of NATO’s vision for the region.
Bush Doctrine: Mission Unaccomplished
Long
before the winds of the Arab Spring began to blow in Tunisia,
and for the past decade, NATO had special designs for the
Middle East and the Gulf. The emergent Western interest in
Arab geography is not new and surfaced when former US
President George W. Bush took office in 2001. In 2002,
former US Secretary of State General Colin Powell launched
the Middle East Initiative (paving the way for the Greater
Middle East Project) that preceded the American invasion of
Iraq. At the time, the US allocated USD 200 million to the
initiative, and tried to implement it through a number of
political, security, and defense agencies. Washington also
sought to engage civil society and several Arab governments,
including those of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, and
Bahrain, in the initiative. Two ‘Forums for the Future’
were held in Morocco (2004) and Bahrain (2005) among
representatives of G8 countries, Middle East leaders, and
business and civil society groups.
However,
the project did not advance very far, stumbling for
financial reasons. In practice, the region was not prepared
to accept this project, because of the shadows cast by the
9/11 bombings, as well as the global ‘War on Terror’
launched by Bush in the wake of the overthrow of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan. In 2004, earlier efforts were
reformulated into the Greater Middle East Project, described
as an ambitious initiative to promote democracy in the
region. The Project’s approach was based on the model used
in prior decades to pressure the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe to promote freedom. The US drew up a comprehensive
plan and presented it to the summit meetings of the G8,
NATO, and the EU. These summits solidified commitments from
Middle Eastern and East Asian countries to implement wide
ranging political and economic reforms, and attempted to
institute processes to hold these countries accountable for
their human rights records.
Regime
change was also part of this strategy. Bush saw the
overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as a model
for political change, and expressed his belief that the
experience could be repeated in other countries through the
establishment of democratic institutions. He saw this as
part of his legacy to help change what he termed as the
traditions of violence, fear, and frustration — what he
viewed as the seeds from which terrorism grew in the Middle
East. He insisted that it was necessary to set up democratic
institutions to respond to the people’s aspirations.
Coordination
for the project was then established with Europe. The G8,
the US, Europe, and NATO adopted the the Greater Middle East
Project during summits held in June 2004. They envisioned
the Middle East at a crossroads and concluded that it needed
to be placed on a pathway towards economic and social reform,
thereby preserving "the United States’ and its allies’
security interests.”
The
project failed shortly thereafter and was completely
abandoned during Bush’s second term. It did not succeed
largely because of the security failures in Afghanistan and
growing resistance against American occupation in Iraq. In
light of the surprises encountered after the invasion of
Iraq, Washington changed many of its priorities. At the very
least, it wanted to pressure the Syrian regime in order to
influence events in Lebanon, Palestine, and Iran. The Syrian
regime offered actual concessions in that regard. However,
the Bush administration realized that its recipe for
installing democracy was flawed, and instead pursued UN
resolution 1559, which called for, among other things,
Syrian political and military withdrawal from Lebanon. This
resolution was to preempt a move against the Syrian regime,
but the July 2006 victory against Israel in Lebanon ended
the siege on Damascus.
The New NATO Doctrine
Arab
and international reactions to NATO’s involvement in Libya
suggests that what happened in Libya could happen in most
Arab countries, particularly those experiencing massive
protest movements amid growing rifts between ruler and
ruled.The Bush administration’s abandonment of the project
did not lead to its complete dismemberment. It remained, in
the eyes of many, the perfect ready–made recipe for
interfering in the region under the pretense of democratic
reform. It now took on a multinational dimension. Many
governments did not notice that the US plan was adopted
internationally, and, in particular, as a joint American–European
project. Many European leaders actively obscured American
initiatives by offering more practical alternatives. As an
example of this, Europe and NATO began a joint defense
strategy where European security and military forces were
placed at the disposal of NATO. At the same time, the
alliance began to enjoy a prime position in European
regional exploits.
Meanwhile,
the project’s critics failed to recognize that it sought
more than regime change. The project identified strategies
and proposed solutions based on an analysis provided in a UN
Human Development Report written by several Arab
intellectuals and experts.
In
this context, those who hailed the American failure in Iraq
believed it was due to a lack of stability in that country.
They did not suspect that other countries in the region
would be the target of foreign intervention. Only Yemeni
President Ali Abdallah Saleh took notice. He summarized the
situation through a Bedouin proverb, “If you see that they
have shaved your brother’s hair, get ready by wetting
yours.” The overthrow of Saddam Hussein was a lesson to
his ruling Arab brethren that their turn will come. However,
Arab regimes sat back and enjoyed their existing security
and stability.
The
latest developments in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen show
that security measures alone cannot keep people under check
and sustain the rule of countries. Long before the Bush
administration lied about weapons of mass destruction, the
dictatorial regime in Iraq and the absence of freedom had
paved the way for the occupation of the country by a foreign
force.
Despite
the presence of dictatorship in Iraq, Washington failed to
convince the people of the region that US intentions were
indeed noble and the Greater Middle East Project failed to
materialize. Rather, the latter was viewed as part of a
foreign agenda imposed by force on the region.
Co–opting the Revolts: The New
Intervention Order
Three
things have changed since then. Today the domestic protest
agenda exists of its own accord independently of foreign
factors. The Americans have been quick to ride that wave.
They absorbed the shock what happened in Tunisia and avoided
falling into the same traps they fell into in the case of
Egypt. This is why they distanced themselves from Hosni
Mubarak and his regime, behaved like a patron for peace in
Yemen, and adopted the protest movement in Syria to such an
extent that they were the first among the international
community to call for Asad’s resignation. Whatever the
context and difference of motives, a foundation now exists
for domestic and foreign agendas to coincide towards one
goal: regime change.
Current
events have also ushered a new military precedent:
intervention no longer requires the cover of the UN nor
faces any effective global protest. As far as NATO’s rules
of engagement are concerned, the alliance has become a
Western tool of choice for foreign intervention. Europe and
the US no longer need to send their forces directly to fight
missions outside of Europe. The international division
fostered by the American invasion of Iraq will not be
repeated, as the Libyan model offers a clear alternative for
what awaits the region. Foreign intervention may follow if
there is no resolution to the current intractable crises
between the people calling for the downfall of their rulers
and the latter’s stalling significant reforms while
relying on security measures instead.
Libya,
The Ruined Revolution
By
Asad Abu Khalil
Al–Akhbar, Cairo, August 26, 2011
This
is no revolution. This is not even a popular uprising. This
is a ruined revolution. Who but NATO can turn a popular
uprising with revolutionary potential into a reactionary
political puppet movement headed by former lieutenants of
Gaddafi? Who but NATO can smash the concrete revolutionary
actions of Arab youths? The dreams of those who expected a
real revolutionary moment in which the entire bizarre model
of government of Jamahiriyyah were trampled upon by the
boots of French and British special forces.
Here
was the brave people of Libya acting on their own to throw
off the shackles of Gaddafi's tyranny before sinister forces
with colonial nostalgia interfered. There Western forces
were the same one totally infatuated with Gaddafi. The
"freedom" president, George W. Bush, was
paradoxically––the paradox of rhetoric only––the US
president who earned the honor of normalizing relations
between the Libyan dictator and Western powers. A Saudi
prince, the notorious Bandar Bin Sultan, had aided Libya in
reaching out to Western countries.
How
could this be a revolution when NATO is now in charge?
If
Egypt and Tunisia can't be said to constitute a real "revolution"
in a Marxist sense, in which political and social powers are
dismantled, the Libyan situation falls far short of such a
criterion.
Liberals
and conservatives (and former leftists) who utter NATO and
“revolution” in the same sentence seem to take little
note of this fact. But it is not the first time they come
together to bless yet another Western military intervention.
Hillary Clinton went––in a matter of weeks really––from
meeting with the head of the Libyan secret police, Mu`tasim––one
of Gaddafi's sons, to counting the regime’s the human
rights violations, and reminding he world of its brutal
nature. Obama did the same. Both flip–flopped because they
have utter contempt for their Arab audiences. They really
don't think that Arabs are smart enough to notice or to
recall their recent stances from weeks ago, when they
embraced the dictator.
The
Libyan people deserve congratulations for overthrowing a
dictator, but they deserve truthful warnings: that the new
Libya may not fulfil the promises of freedom and prosperity.
Western oil companies are scrambling to get a foothold in
the new Libya, just as they competed to win favor with
Qaddafi’s's regime. The Libyan Transitional Council does
not bode well: it is headed by Qaddafi's Minister of Justice
and his second–in–command is the former mentor of none
other than Gaddafi’s son Sayf Al–Islam.
The Gaddafi era may have
ended, but with NATO in charge, it is likely that the new
leader of Libya is another Hamid Karzai or an even more
compliant client of Western powers. Mustafa Abd al–Jalil
will be the weakest leader of any Middle East country; With
NATO in charge, it is certain that Libya won't be free. For
that to happen, the Libyan people have to rise up again,
this time against the external forces of colonial powers,
and against the reactionary ideologies that the new Libyan
government will bring along with it.
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